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Abstract 
Recent papers on the Capgras delusion have focused on the role played by 
subpersonal abductive inference in the formation and maintenance of the 
delusional belief. In these accounts, the delusional belief is posited as the first 
delusion-related event of which the patient is conscious. As a consequence, an 
explanatory role for anomalous patient experience is denied. The aim of this 
paper is to challenge this revisionist position and to integrate subpersonal 
inference within a model of the Capgras delusion which includes a role for 
experiential content. I argue that the following revisionist claims are prob-
lematic: (a) that a fully-formed belief enters consciousness, and (b) that this is 
the first conscious delusion-related event. Instead, it is my contention that 
a delusional thought (arrived at through subpersonal abductive inference) 
and an anomalous experience co-occur in consciousness prior to the for-
mation of the delusional belief. The co-occurrence of thought and anomalous 
experience overcomes problems with the revisionist position resulting in an 
account of the Capgras delusion with greater explanatory efficacy. 
Keywords: Bayes’ theorem; Abductive inference; Anomalous experience; En-
dorsement and explanationist accounts; Indicative imagination; Face recogni-
tion system; Skin conductance response (SCR). 
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1. Introduction 
Patients suffering from the Capgras delusion typically believe that at least one 
family member or friend—some significant other—is an impostor (Capgras 
& Reboul-Lachaux 1923). The ‘impostor’ is acknowledged by the patient to be a 
close physical match to the putatively genuine other who is always absent.7 
When considering the Capgras delusion, contemporary accounts typically 
seek to address the following inter-related questions (or certainly are required 
to answer these): (i) What causes this particular delusional belief? (ii) Why is 
the belief accepted? (iii) Why is it maintained?  
With regard to (i), theorists look to explain the belief’s specific content; that is, 
what causes the patient to believe this in particular (say, in the case of the 
Capgras husband, that his wife is an impostor). In the case of (ii), what needs 
to be clarified is why and how the proposition “This woman is not my 
wife, she is an impostor” becomes something that the patient believes rather 
than merely entertains and then dismisses. Finally, even after forming the 
belief, it needs to be explained why the patient is so resistant to revising it, 
especially given the often overwhelming evidence available to contradict the 
delusional content. 
Addressing question (iii) is not a concern of this paper, and will be touched on 
only briefly in Section 6. Of interest are questions (i) and (ii). The first con-
cerns characteristics of the delusional content; the second with the epistemic 
status of the delusion: that it is a belief. The focus of this paper is therefore on 
factors that contribute to the formation of the delusional belief with specific 
monothematic ‘imposter’ content. In addition, while acknowledging the neu-
ropsychological disruption underlying the disorder, as well as recent discus-
sion on subpersonal abductive reasoning, I wish to emphasize the role played 
by patient experience—often referred to as ‘anomalous’ in the literature—in 
the explanatory account proffered here. It is my view that the co-occurrence 
of anomalous experience and delusional belief creates an interaction of mu-
tual effect, such that the former validates the latter and the latter authenti-
cates the former (Young 2008a, 2011a, 2011b). The result of which is an en-
trenched delusional state. The account I propose here also has features that 
are compatible with explanationist and endorsement approaches to the 
Capgras delusion. 
 
 
                                                             
7 Young (1999) notes that there have been reports of Capgras patients who claim to perceive dif-
ferences in the ‘impostor’ but when pressed on what exactly these differences are often have 
difficulty pointing them out. See Frazer and Roberts (1994), however, for an example of where 
this is not the case and specific differences are articulated. 
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1.1 A bit of background information 
One way to understand why the belief is formed is to consider what function 
it serves. On this issue, contemporary accounts tend to fall into two camps: 
those that favour an explanationist approach and those that favour an en-
dorsement approach (Pacherie 2009). Until recently, each approach assumed 
that an anomalous (conscious) experience occurred prior to the formation of 
the delusional belief. The nature of this experiential content is such that the 
belief either endorses the experience—that is, the experience contains ‘impos-
tor wife’ content such that one believes what one sees (much like seeing a tree 
in front of you causes you to believe there is a tree in front of you)—or the 
belief is positioned so as to explain the anomalous nature of the experience. 
That is, the (delusional) belief is selected as the best candidate for the job. The 
experience is itself said to be the result of some form of neurological disrup-
tion (Ellis & Young 1990). Depending on which approach one favours, the de-
lusional belief functions either to explain the anomalous experience or to en-
dorse its content. The first stage of either approach can therefore be broken 
down into the following components: neurological deficit, anomalous (con-
scious) experience, delusional belief (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Shows the different components within stage 1 of a traditional explanation of the 
Capgras delusion, and how the explanationist and endorsements approaches differ in terms of the 
relationship between anomalous experience and delusional belief. 
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In their 2010 paper, Abductive inference and delusional belief, Max Coltheart 
and colleagues (Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton) present a revised account of the 
Capgras delusion in which they argue—using the example of a Capgras hus-
band in the presence of his wife—that (1) the emergence into consciousness of 
the belief “This is not my wife, she is an impostor” is the product of a Bayesi-
an-style abductive inference (one revision), (2) that the process described in 
(1) occurs completely at the subpersonal level (that is, below the level of con-
scious awareness; another revision), and (3) that, as a consequence of (1) and 
(2), there is no longer a need for anomalous phenomenal content to play an 
explanatory role in the aetiology of the delusional state (a further revision 
that contrasts sharply with figure 1). An abductive inference is posited as a 
means of selecting the best hypothesis from those available to explain a dis-
crepancy within the patient’s face recognition system (see Breen, Caine & 
Coltheart 2000; and Ellis & Lewis 2001; Ellis & Young 1990); a discrepancy 
identified by the patient subpersonally, which Coltheart et al. refer to as ab-
normal data O. At best, any anomalous experience is seen merely as a conse-
quence not a cause of the belief. 
Coltheart et al.’s model is explanationist because the process of Bayesian-style 
abductive inference is used to select the best hypothesis from those available 
to explain abnormal data O. It differs from traditional explanationist ac-
counts, however, insofar as what needs to be explained is not something the 
patient is conscious of. Coltheart et al.’s model therefore posits the following 
procedure: neurological deficit causes abnormal data O, Bayesian-style abduc-
tive inference to the best explanation selects the hypothesis “This person is 
not my wife…”, the delusional belief—“This person is not my wife…”—enters 
consciousness (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Shows the different components within stage 1 of the explanatory model proposed by 
Coltheart et al. While still an explanationist approach, within this model the delusional belief is 
no longer posited to explain the anomalous (conscious) experience; rather the belief is said to be 
the product of Bayesian-style abductive inference which selects the best hypothesis to explain (at 
the subpersonal level) abnormal data O. 
 
1.2 Aims 
For a number of years now, I have argued that patient experience is an im-
portant feature of any explanation of the Capgras delusion. I have also argued 
that a clearer way of conceiving of this ‘anomalous’ experience is required 
(see Young 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). In light of Coltheart et al.’s revisionist 
model, which removes the traditional role of anomalous experience from the 
explanation, the aim of this paper is to reinstate this role. Specifically, I intend 
to proffer a role for anomalous patient experience within stage 1 of an ex-
planatory account of the Capgras delusion (that is, to the formation of the de-
lusional belief). To support the case for the explanatory relevance of patient 
experience, I will (i) highlight the problems with Coltheart et al.’s revisionist 
model, (ii) show how these problems can be resolved by reinstating a role for 
anomalous patient experience, and (iii) present an account of stage 1 which 
does not require that Coltheart et al.’s revisionist approach be abandoned 
altogether. Instead, the revisionist approach merely needs to endorse the co-
occurrence of an impostor thought (which is transformed into an impostor 
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belief after entering consciousness) and patient experience, which is itself 
transformed from an initial salient sense of unfamiliarity (or estrangement) 
into a normative (when in the presence of a stranger) lack of familiarity. The 
co-occurrence of belief and experience become congruent and mutually veri-
fying. The experiential state gives credence to the freshly emerged impostor 
thought such that the corresponding (delusional) belief is formed to explain 
the experience. For its part, the belief then helps shape the experience, and an 
‘impostor’ is duly perceived. After that, the belief continues simultaneously to 
shape and endorse the patient’s experience, not only in terms of seeing an 
impostor but also in terms of the normative lack of familiarity that accompa-
nies this perception. 
Before discussing any of this in detail, however, I begin with an overview of 
Coltheart et al.’s model, including an analysis of what makes ‘abnormal data 
O’ abnormal, such that it should be best explained by what is sometimes re-
ferred to in the literature as the stranger hypothesis. 
 
2. Coltheart et al.’s model 
2.1 The neurocognitive basis for abnormal data O 
As part of their revised model of delusions, Coltheart et al. endorse the work 
of William James (James 1890/1950) and Brendan Maher (Maher 1974). 
Coltheart et al. agree with these authors that the delusional belief is essential-
ly a means of explaining the patient’s unusual bodily sensations (James) or 
anomalous perceptions (Maher). An explanatory model of this kind is by no 
means new, of course (see Bayne & Pacherie 2004; Bortolotti 2005; Davies & 
Coltheart 2000; Ellis & Young 1990; Gilleen & David 2005; Klee 2004; Stone & 
Young 1997; Young & de Pauw 2002). These earlier accounts, however, tended 
to state or otherwise imply that the anomalous sensation or perception—
which the delusional belief is used to explain—is something the patient is con-
scious of: it forms part of the phenomenal quality of their (conscious) experi-
ence. In contrast, what is revisionist about Coltheart et al.’s model (as noted 
above) is that the explanandum—the sensation or perception in need of expla-
nation—is identified subpersonally. As Coltheart et al. state: 
[T]he first delusion-relevant event of which the patient is aware is the belief 
‘‘That isn’t my wife’’. Everything that preceded the occurrence of that belief 
and was responsible for the belief having come about—the stroke, the neu-
ropsychological disconnection, the absence of an autonomic response when 
the wife is next seen, the invocation of a process of abductive inference to 
yield some hypothesis to explain this, and the successful generation of such 
a hypothesis—all of these processes are unconscious. What’s conscious is 
only the outcome that this chain of processes generated: the conscious belief 
“This person isn’t my wife”. (2010: 264; emphasis added) 
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One part of Coltheart et al.’s account which does remain consistent with the 
position adopted by these other theorists, however, is the claim that the ori-
gins of the Capgras delusion can be traced to a disruption in the patient’s 
normal neuropsychological functioning. Again, in the words of Coltheart et al.: 
What could possibly suggest to someone the idea that the woman he is 
looking at (who is in fact his wife) is not his wife but some complete 
stranger? We believe the answer to this question is: a neuropsychological 
impairment that has disconnected the face recognition system (itself in-
tact) from the autonomic nervous system (itself intact). (2010: 262) 
Although not stated explicitly in the 2010 paper (although see Davies, 
Coltheart, Langdon & Breen 2001), Coltheart et al. seem to be following Ellis 
and Lewis’s (2001) explanatory approach to the Capgras delusion. Thus, after 
normal processing by the face recognition unit (FRU; located within the fusi-
form gyrus; see Schweinberger & Burton, 2003, for details), there occurs a 
mismatch between information processed by the component of the face 
recognition system believed to be responsible for the identification of a per-
son’s face—the person identity nodes (PINs; located in the anterior temporal 
region)—and that responsible for the subject’s normal autonomic response to 
a familiar person: the affective response to familiar stimuli component be-
lieved to be subserved by the ventral limbic structure projecting to the amyg-
dala (see Breen et al. 2000, for a more detailed discussion on this, and also 
Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini 2000; Haxby, Gobbini, Furey, Ishai, Schouten, et al. 
2001).8 This can be seen when Coltheart et al. state that the patient’s wife “has 
been replaced by someone else, someone whom [the husband considers to be] 
a stranger even while acknowledging that this person does look very like [his] 
wife” (2010: 262). In the case of the Capgras husband, the PINs component is 
said to be intact enabling him to recognize (physically) the person in front of 
him, but the autonomic response is disrupted, as evidenced by the reduction 
in skin conductance response (SCR) (Brighetti, Bonifacci, Borlimi, Rosita & 
Ottaviani 2007; Ellis, Young, Quayle & de Pauw 1997; and Hirstein & Rama-
chandran 1997). Together, this produces abnormal data O. Moreover, and 
again not explicitly stated by Coltheart et al., it is my contention that a likely 
location for the processing of O—based on Ellis & Lewis’ (2001) model of face 
recognition—is the Integrative device. This component is postulated by Ellis 
and Lewis to enable a comparison to be made between the expected autonom-
ic response (based on a normative state; see below for discussion) and the 
                                                             
8 Originally, conscious recognition was believed to involve the ventral route which projects from 
the primary visual cortex to the inferotemporal cortex (see Bauer 1984). Conversely, in the case of 
Capgras delusion, the underlying aetiology of delusional beliefs ― the anomalous phenomenal 
experience ― was believed to stem from damage to the dorsal route which projects, again, from 
the primary visual cortex, only this time to the posterior parietal cortex. Breen et al. (2000), how-
ever, suggest that covert recognition is subserved, not by the dorsal route (which they argue plays 
no part in visual recognition), but by pathways that connect the ventral stream to the limbic sys-
tem (ventral limbic structure) and, in particular, the amygdala. (I shall adopt Breen et al.’s revi-
sion here.) 
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actual response. As a result of this comparison, Ellis and Lewis further conjec-
ture that some form of attribution takes places. Perhaps this attribution (of 
the cause of the discrepancy identified within the Integrative device) is ar-
rived at through a process of Bayesian-style abductive inference, as Coltheart 
et al. maintain. 
 
2.2 Data O as a deviation from the normative state 
In exploring this possibility further, for O to be identified as abnormal within 
the Capgras patient, there must occur a discrepancy between O and some 
normative state of facial recognition (On). As Coltheart et al. remark: “When 
you do encounter her, you will expect the usual consequences—a response by 
your autonomic nervous system. But this does not happen” (p.263; emphasis 
added). What might the discrepancy between the expected and the actual look 
like? Ceteris paribus, when in the presence of his wife, the following norma-
tive state should arise in the husband’s face recognition system. Let us call this 
version of O the normative wife state (Onw). 
(Onw) PINs activation occurs (signifying visual identification) in conjunction 
with heightened autonomic arousal (as measured by increased SCR). 
When in the presence of a stranger, however, the normative state is captured 
by the following version of O. Let us call this the normative stranger state 
(Ons). 
(Ons) PINs inactivity (signifying no visual identification) is associated with low 
autonomic arousal (as measured by reduced SCR). 
The abnormal state of O within the Capgras patient consists of PINs activity 
(signifying identification) and low autonomic arousal (associated with a 
stranger). Consequently, it matches neither normative state (Onw) nor (Ons), 
resulting in an error signal. From the perspective of the Capgras husband, 
then, given the state of O and its deviation from (Onw) and (Ons), how might he 
explain the abnormality: this error signal? 
 
2.3 The role of Bayesian-style abductive inference 
According to Coltheart et al., at the subpersonal level, two mutually exclusive 
hypotheses present themselves: the wife hypothesis (Hw) and the stranger 
hypothesis (Hs), respectively. 
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(Hw) This person who looks like my wife and claims to be my wife is my wife. 
(Hs) This person who looks like my wife and claims to be my wife is not 
my wife. 
When considering each of these, the Bayesian approach adopted by Coltheart 
et al. entails calculating which hypothesis best explains O (the abnormal data). 
The calculation involves offsetting the prior probability (prior to observing O) 
of each hypothesis being true against the explanatory power of the hypothesis 
(the ability of each to make sense of O). Explanatory prowess is a function of 
how well O is explained by the hypothesis, such that, given the truth of the 
hypothesis, it indicates the likelihood of O occurring. If a hypothesis explains 
O well, then the likelihood of it occurring given its truth will be high. As a 
means of demonstrating Bayes’ theorem, Coltheart et al. present their own 
estimated probability ratios. The prior probability of (Hs) they estimate at 
1:100, whereas the prior probability of (Hw) is given the much higher value of 
99:100. When prior probability is considered in conjunction with the explana-
tory power of each to explain O (which includes the estimated likelihood of O 
occurring if a given hypothesis is correct), Coltheart et al. attempt to demon-
strate (relative to each hypothesis available) that given a sufficiently high ex-
planatory power, it is reasonable to select one hypothesis over the other as the 
most suitable. Thus, whilst the prior probability of the truth of (Hs)—that the 
person is in fact a stranger even though she looks just like the patient’s wife 
and claims to be her—may be low (estimated at 1:100), it is nevertheless 
claimed to have high explanatory prowess because it is more able to explain 
the abnormality evident in O than the wife hypothesis despite (Hw) having an 
estimated higher prior probability of being true. Through the use of abductive 
inference, Coltheart et al. argue that the hypothesis corresponding to “This is 
not my wife…” is selected at the subpersonal level in manner consistent with 
normal reasoning by the Capgras husband. 
 
3. Challenges to Coltheart et al.’s model 
The claim that the selection of hypothesis (Hs) is consistent with normal rea-
soning supports Maher’s view (see Maher 1974, 1988, 1999; and also Gerrans 
2002) that delusional beliefs are the product of a rational process. But as al-
luded to earlier, the fact that this putatively rational process occurs subper-
sonally and functions to explain abnormal data O, which the patient is not 
consciously aware of, is in contrast to the view expressed by Maher: that we 
should look to the nature and intensity of the phenomenal experience when 
trying to explain delusional beliefs. It also stands against Gerrans (2000) claim 
that what the patient is trying to explain is a “deeply disturbing and intracta-
ble phenomenal state” (p. 116). Coltheart et al. do not reject the role of patient 
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experience altogether, however. In keeping with Maher and Gerrans, they 
accept that some delusional beliefs are likely to be a response to unusual pa-
tient experience; just not the Capgras delusion. 
Criticism of Coltheart et al.’s model comes in two forms. First, whether the 
selection of hypothesis (Hs) is the result of a rational process; that is, whether 
it shows evidence of a normative Bayesian model at work or, instead, some 
form of cognitive bias. Second, whether the delusional belief is the first delu-
sion-related event of which the patient is conscious, or whether the patient is 
also conscious of an altered phenomenal state (an anomalous experience) 
prior to the formation of the belief. 
 
3.1 Re-interpreting Bayesian probabilities 
Recently, McKay (2012) has challenged the claim that the selection of hypothe-
sis (Hs) is based on a normative Bayesian model and therefore the product of a 
rational abductive inference. Instead, and in accordance with Aimola Davies 
and Davies (2009), he proposes a further cognitive deficit—a bias towards ex-
planatory adequacy—which results in the patient favouring the hypothesis 
that best explains the perceptual data (abnormal data O) irrespective of its 
low prior probability. 
To explain: recall how, when presenting the prior probabilities of the compet-
ing hypotheses available to explain abnormal data O (see Section 2), Coltheart 
et al. estimated (Hw) at 99:100 and (Hs) as 1:100. McKay (2012) considers (Hs) to 
be “a fantastically unlikely occurrence” (p. 340), and therefore the ratio of 
1:100 to be somewhat unrealistic. Instead, he suggests a ratio of 1:3650. When 
the prior probability of (Hs) is set at this more realistic (although, by his own 
admission, still quite generous) level, McKay argues that one could not rea-
sonably expect (Hs) to be selected as the most suitable hypothesis. 
Here, then, lies the problem with inserting what are effectively unsubstantiat-
ed values into Bayes’ theorem: different outcomes are produced relative to the 
values one computes, and there is no way of knowing what these values 
should be. The inclusion of estimated values is, of course, intended for illus-
trative purposes, rather than as a proof. Nevertheless, it does highlight a key 
difference in the approaches of Coltheart et al. and McKay. Given the proba-
bilities proffered by McKay, one could not rationally arrive at the stranger 
hypothesis (Hs) as the best explanation of abnormal data O. Consequently, the 
selection of hypothesis (Hs) could not be the result of normal reasoning, as 
Coltheart et al. would have us believe, and so the patient must be biased 
against the normative Bayesian model. The implication of this, for McKay, 
is that a further pathology is required to explain the selection of the stranger 
hypothesis: namely, a bias towards explanatory adequacy. This 
means that the patient’s subperson processing is biased in favour of the ex-
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planatory prowess of the stranger hypothesis irrespective of its low prior 
probability value. 
McKay and Coltheart et al. disagree over the extent to which the abductive 
inference employed by the patient falls within the parameters of normal rea-
soning. What they have in common is the view that the perceptual state the 
hypothesis is trying to explain is not something the patient is conscious of. In 
both cases, the first delusion-related event to enter consciousness is the belief 
“This person is not my wife…”. In the next section, I present a problem with 
this view. Throughout, I will focus on Coltheart et al.’s model, although it 
should be understood that the criticism is equally applicable to McKay. 
 
3.2 Problems with the claim that the belief is the first conscious delusion-
related event 
According to the example used by Coltheart et al., prior to the neuropsycho-
logical disconnection (which they attribute to a stroke)—call it t1—the Capgras 
husband’s face processing system is working normally and so conforms to the 
normative requirements of (Onw) when in the presence of his wife, and (Ons) 
when in the presence of strangers. At t2, however—after the disconnection—
when the husband is in the presence of his wife, data O no longer conforms to 
the requirements of (Onw). Following Coltheart et al.’s model, at time t1, and at 
the conscious level, when the husband sees his wife presumably he is aware 
of the fact that the person in front of him is his wife. Forming part of his con-
scious set of background beliefs (inter alia) is the belief corresponding some-
what unremarkably to “This is my wife”. At t2, however, all remains the same 
within the patient’s experience except that the belief which now enters con-
sciousness and forms part of his background beliefs has changed from “This is 
my wife” to “This is not my wife”, and no doubt stands out because of this. 
Certainly it would be inconsistent with the belief that she looks just like her or 
sounds like her, acts like her, is wearing her clothes, claims to be her (etc). Of 
course, the extended belief “This is not my wife but an impostor” would be 
consistent with these other beliefs. Nevertheless, it would still result in a sud-
den (and dare I say it, inexplicable) switch from “This is my wife” at t1 to “This 
is not my wife but an impostor” at t2, given that all else remains the same. 
Importantly, then, if all else remains the same from t1 to t2 (recall that, for 
Coltheart et al., the first delusion-relevant event of which the patient is aware 
is the belief “This is not my wife…”) it is difficult to understand how the sud-
den emergence of the impostor belief at t2 could be experienced as anything 
other than an unbidden thought (Young 2011b). The Capgras husband’s wife 
physically appears to him in the normal way, is recognized by the FRU and 
PINs in the normal way, thereby producing a normal visual percept of his wife 
(consciously experienced as such, at least in terms of her physical features), 
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but suddenly the belief “This is not my wife…” ‘pops’ into his head. Abductive 
inference provides an explanation of how the best candidate hypothesis is 
selected given abnormal data O (whether based on a normative or biased 
Bayesian model). What is not made clear, however, is what is involved in ac-
cepting and therefore transforming a hypothesis into a belief below the level 
of consciousness, or how this subpersonal selection and acceptance relates to 
any conscious endorsement of the belief, including coming to understand why 
I (qua the Capgras husband) suddenly believe my wife is an impostor, rather 
than that I am simply experiencing a recurring unbidden thought with con-
tent “This is not my wife but an impostor”. 
Given that there is a conscious-subconscious (or personal-subpersonal) divide 
within Coltheart et al.’s account, how is the sudden presentation of the delu-
sional belief, at the conscious level, to be understood by the patient at this 
same conscious level? If the husband is unaware of reduced autonomic 
arousal when in the presence of his wife (which Coltheart et al. hold to be the 
case)—which forms part of the evidence used at the subpersonal level to de-
termine that something is different with the percept and therefore that there 
is a discrepancy in need of explanation (abnormal data O)—then what is he to 
make of this sudden change of belief relative to his other background beliefs 
when it emerges seemingly fully endorsed into consciousness? Experientially, 
is there a sense of conviction which accompanies the sudden emergence of the 
impostor belief? If so, what causes this? If not, to reiterate, would the sudden 
appearance of the belief, with its unprecedented content (from the patient’s 
perspective) not be treated as an unbidden thought? 
 
4. Introducing a sense of conviction 
According to Turner and Coltheart (2010), prior to their emergence into con-
sciousness, thoughts are evaluated courtesy of an unconscious checking sys-
tem. Thoughts that require extra checking are ‘tagged’ and are picked up by 
the conscious checking system for further evaluation before being accepted or 
rejected (depending on the outcome of this second-level evaluation). Thoughts 
that are tagged subpersonally are “accompanied by the normal experience of 
doubt” (2010: 355). In the case of patients suffering from delusions (including 
the Capgras delusion), however, “this unconscious checking system fails, re-
sulting in an absence of doubt which [Turner and Coltheart argue] confers an 
inappropriate feeling of conviction” (ibid.). 
In the case of a non-deluded husband, should the thought “This is not my 
wife…” suddenly pop into his conscious awareness, then if it has been tagged 
correctly at the subpersonal level, it should be accompanied by doubt and 
likely be rejected after further conscious evaluation. In the case of the Capgras 
husband, in contrast, the proposition “This is not my wife…” is not tagged and 
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so is not accompanied by doubt; rather, the thought enters consciousness with 
an accompanying sense of conviction: the sort of conviction one typically as-
sociates with something one believes. 
An accompanying sense of conviction could certainly be used to distinguish 
between delusional and unbidden thoughts. One could therefore argue that 
the patient does not experience the sudden emergence into consciousness (at 
t2) of the thought “This is not my wife…” as unbidden because of the sense of 
conviction which allegedly accompanies it. Such a possibility does of course 
raise the issue of whether subpersonal tagging is in fact faulty in the case of 
the Capgras patient, as Turner and Coltheart suggest, or simply not used, given 
that Coltheart et al. posit that hypothesis (Hs) was selected using normal rea-
soning. If the hypothesis was selected using normal reasoning then what 
would an unconscious checking system be checking the hypothesis against? It 
would seem that there is no reason to refer to faulty tagging in the case of 
Coltheart et al.’s approach because such a tag should not accompany the 
thought (the stranger hypothesis) if it was arrived at through normal reason-
ing. In the case of McKay’s explanation, however, given his need for a second-
stage cognitive bias (at the subpersonal level), reference to a faulty tagging 
system might help differentiate delusional from unbidden thought; although 
I accept that this is merely speculation. 
 
4.1 Why a sense of conviction is not enough 
Despite questions over precisely how it occurs, particularly within Coltheart et 
al.’s account of normal reasoning, I nevertheless concede that the salience of 
an accompanying sense of conviction would make the patient feel that the 
content of the thought reliably indicates some truth about the state of the 
world: in this case that this woman is not who she claims to be. This, I accept 
is compatible with the role of a belief which is to represent the world as being 
a certain way. I also concede that a sense of conviction helps differentiate the 
thought from something that one might otherwise experience as unbidden. 
Nevertheless, I still feel more work needs to be done to explain the move from 
subpersonal hypothesis selection to fully-fledged (delusional) belief formation. 
A sense of conviction may form part of this explanation but it is not sufficient. 
To illustrate why not, consider the following example, presented by Davies 
and Egan (2013) (although originally taken from Chatterjee & Mennemeier, 
1996: 227), of a patient (HS) who, although recovered from anosognosia (the 
inability to recognize one’s disability), still felt that the idea the he could move 
his paralysed limb was credible even though it was not something he actually 
continued to believe. 
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E: What was the consequence of the stroke? 
HS: The left hand here is dead and the left leg was pretty much. 
HS: (later): I still feel as if when I am in a room and I have to get up and go 
walking… I just feel like I should be able to. 
E: You have a belief that you could actually do that? 
HS: I do not have a belief, just the exact opposite. I just have the feeling that 
sometimes I feel like I can get up and do something and I have to tell myself 
‘no I can’t’. 
HS does not believe that he can “get up and do something”; yet he feels that the 
idea is credible. What does he mean when he states that he feels like he can 
get up and go walking? Likewise, what is it to have an idea (even a credible 
idea) that this can be done? Might this be reference to a sense of conviction 
which accompanies the thought? Possibly; possibly not. In truth, it is unclear. 
What is clear is that HS does not believe he can “get up and do something”. If 
he does not believe this then what is it that he rejects? Must HS have an initial 
and fleeting belief that he can do these things which he then rejects? To reit-
erate, he does not believe that it is a belief he is rejecting. Moreover, is the fol-
lowing even coherent: “I believe x but I do not believe that I believe it and so 
reject it”?9 Whatever label we attach to the mental state with content “you can 
get up and do something”, and whatever the cause of this mental content, it is 
not consciously endorsed by HS; hence its rejection. 
HS does not believe he is rejecting a belief, only a credible idea. Consider, 
then, the following extract taken from Turner & Coltheart (2010: 371) of 
a Capgras patient in the early stages of recovery: 
Examiner: What has made you realise that they’re just imaginations? People 
telling you that? 
Patient: No it’s just myself that’s done it. I’ve started going through it, and 
seeing what could possibly happen and what couldn’t happen. That was 
wrong, that couldn’t happen. Even though it has happened it couldn’t. Mary 
couldn’t suddenly disappear from the room, so there must be an explanation 
for it. So then I try and workout what... 
She [the imposter] knows me way back. The lady knows me way back. She 
could say things that happened 40 years ago, and I wonder where she gets 
them from. And then I worked it out and I’ve wondered if it’s Mary all the 
time. It’s nobody else. 
                                                             
9 Currie (2000) in fact draws a distinction between a first-order belief (that p) and higher-order 
belief (believing that p) in his account of delusions. 
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Turner and Coltheart theorize that during the acute stage of the patient’s dis-
order, both his unconscious and conscious checking systems were impaired. 
Thus, he formed the delusional belief which entered consciousness accompa-
nied by a sense of conviction (lack of doubt) and so presumably was not 
checked by the conscious checking system (there was no reason to check it 
given that it was not tagged). However, the conscious checking system can be 
triggered by external factors (such as friends/relatives saying that the alleged 
impostor is really who they claim to be); but, initially, this too was faulty, so 
there was no rejection of the belief. What has changed, according to Turner 
and Coltheart, is that the conscious checking system now appears to be work-
ing which is why the patient now believes that the person is and always was 
Mary. Yet Turner and Coltheart claim (correctly, I would say) that the first 
factor impairment (the occurrence of abnormal data O) is still producing the 
thought (as they refer to it, not belief) that the woman in the house is not his 
wife, which the patient is able to challenge owing to his now correctly func-
tioning conscious evaluative system. 
Let us consider the changes to this patient in a more structured way. At t1 
(prior to the disorder) the patient believes Mary is his wife. At t2 (with the on-
set of the disorder), abnormal data O is produced when Mary is present. Hy-
pothesis (Hs) is selected as the best explanation for this and the belief “This is 
not my wife…” enters consciousness accompanied by a sense of conviction. 
This belief is not consciously evaluated and rejected, owing to problems with 
the conscious checking system. At t3 (at which point the conscious checking 
system is functioning again), the patient is able to challenge the thought “This 
is not my wife…”. 
It is not unreasonable to allow that after some re-evaluation the patient could 
reject the belief “This person is not my wife…”. I also concur with Turner and 
Coltheart that, owing to continued neurological impairment, abnormal data O 
would still be produced and still need to be explained. If the thought “This is 
not my wife…” is still entering consciousness then this must mean that the 
stranger hypothesis is still being selected. The consequence of this is that it 
needs to be challenged by the recovering patient and so rejected continually. 
If one holds that hypothesis (Hs) enters consciousness as a belief, then we have 
a situation at t3 similar to that discussed in the context of patient HS whereby 
the Capgras patient believes x and yet does not believe that he believes x. This 
conflict is removed, of course, if, at t3, the patient is merely aware of the 
thought x (perhaps even of the thought feeling credible) and yet does not be-
lieve x. What is not clear from Coltheart et al.’s model, and the argument of 
Turner and Coltheart, is how we arrive at a mere thought at t3 given that 
(a) we had a belief at t2 and (b) the mechanism which brought about the belief 
at t2 has not changed. 
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5. Building a case for the explanatory role of patient experience 
One way to resolve this problem is to hold that when the stranger hypothesis 
enters consciousness at t2 it is not yet held as a belief but merely acknowl-
edged, even entertained, as a thought. Further explanation is required detail-
ing how this thought is then given sufficient credence to be transformed into 
a belief. It is towards such an explanation that I now turn; one that rein-
states an explanatory role for patient experience within Coltheart et al.’s revi-
sionist model. 
 
5.1 Anomalous experience in the absence of delusional belief 
Turner and Coltheart provide an example of what they refer to as first factor 
neuropsychological impairment in the absence of conscious or unconscious 
checking impairments. Below is an extract taken from a patient who had un-
dergone temporal lobe surgery as a treatment for epilepsy (adapted from 
Turner & Coltheart 2010: 371-72): 
Interviewer: After the operation, did you notice any change? 
Patient: Yes, the first thing I noticed was Mum, when she walked in the room, 
it was just a… it was cardboard… an image, if that’s the right word… it was like 
a picture of her, but it wasn’t her… it’s hard to, I can’t sort of explain it ’cause 
it… inside… it’s hard. 
Interviewer: Right. It looked like a real person, did it? 
Patient: Oh, yeah. There’s Mum walking in the room. 
Interviewer: Right. So you knew it looked like your Mum, but… 
[Section omitted from original] 
Patient: She… I don’t know… so you can look different by expression or… just 
through feeling, you can look different by, you know, doing your hair or 
whatever, but it wasn’t different in that way, it was of having the different 
inside of her, I can’t sort of explain it… 
[Section omitted from original] 
Patient: Just didn’t feel like her. 
Interviewer: How did that feel to you? 
Patient: Scary…. Has their lifestyle changed? Have I changed? Have they 
changed in a funny sort of way? I don’t know. It’s weird and it gets confusing. 
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Given that this patient is said to have a first factor neuropsychological im-
pairment, and given that it is claimed by Turner and Coltheart that what pre-
vents her from developing “a Capgras-like delusion” (2010: 371) is intact con-
scious and unconscious checking systems not, it would seem, a different first-
factor neuropsychological impairment, it seems reasonable to conclude from 
this that these authors are suggesting that the patient has the same abnormal 
data O (in need of explanation) as the Capgras patient. What is also suggested 
is that the intact unconscious checking system prevents the stranger hypothe-
sis from entering consciousness as a belief; rather it “enables [the patient] to 
describe the thought in ‘as if’ terms…” (ibid.). This, again, raises the question 
of why the unconscious checking system would tag the stranger hypothesis 
(thus preventing it from becoming a belief in the absence of further evalua-
tion and confirmation) given that it is arrived at, according to Coltheart et al. 
using abductive inference within the parameters of normal reasoning. That 
issue aside: what this example does illustrate is that in conjunction with the 
neuropsychological impairment (suggestive of abnormal data O) the patient 
has an anomalous experience when in the presence of her mother. As she 
states: It just does not feel like her.  
If one is arguing that the patient above and the Capgras patient share the 
same underlying neuropsychological impairment, and that the only reason 
Capgras-like symptoms are not presented in the patient treated for epilepsy is 
the intact conscious and unconscious checking systems, then it seems reason-
able to surmise that whatever is producing the feeling that this is not the pa-
tient’s mother would also produce a corresponding feeling (mutatis mutandis) 
in the Capgras husband in relation to his wife. The non-deluded patient does 
not hold the belief “This is not my mother…”, but apparently has ‘as if’ 
thoughts to that effect? Now, it may be that the ‘as-if’ thoughts are not accom-
panied by a sense of conviction. If so, then what prevents them from being 
experienced as unbidden? The patient does not experience the thoughts as 
unbidden because these thoughts are accompanied by an anomalous experi-
ence. The stranger hypothesis (courtesy of trying to explain abnormal data O 
at the subpersonal level) enters consciousness as the thought “This is not 
my mother…” (or some such thing) and is not treated as unbidden because 
it is accompanied by the anomalous experience. Given what the pa-
tient is experiencing, the thoughts have a context: for what sense could she 
make of such ‘as if’ thoughts unless they are accompanied by some form of 
anomalous experience? 
 
5.2 What the accompanying anomalous experience adds to the explanation 
When comparing the non-deluded patient with a Capgras patient, given the 
suggested similarity between the two in terms of abnormal data O, it is not 
clear why this patient would have an accompanying anomalous experience 
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and the Capgras patient would not. Moreover, if in both cases abductive infer-
ence selects the stranger hypothesis as the best explanation which allegedly 
enters consciousness as an ‘impostor’ belief then, in the case of the non-
deluded patient, the following would entail (as commented on before): I be-
lieve x but do not believe that I believe x. If it is suggested that, in the case of 
the non-deluded patient, the unconscious checking mechanism prevents the 
hypothesis from being accepted as a belief when entering consciousness then 
it needs to be explained how this system is able to tag a thought that is arrived 
at using a process that is deemed by Coltheart et al. to be rational, and indeed 
why it would want to do this. 
Instead, it is my contention that the occurrence in consciousness of the 
thought (not the belief) “This is not my mother…” (or something similar), 
alongside a salient difference in the patient’s experience when in the presence 
of her mother, not only makes her feel uneasy (it was scary for her) but makes 
her question the situation. As she states: ‘Has their lifestyle changed? Have 
I changed? Have they changed in a funny sort of way? I don’t know. It’s weird 
and it gets confusing’. The anomalous experience puts the thought into con-
text and may even give it some credence (as with HS, the thought—or idea—
may feel credible), but this is not enough for the thought to achieve the status 
of a belief (again, as was the case with HS): for the patient does not believe 
that the thought “This is not my mother…” represents some truth about the 
world. In short, she does not believe it. 
What role is this thought playing if it is not a belief? To address this question, 
consider the work of Bayne and Pacherie (2005). These authors, while discuss-
ing Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) distinction between imagination and be-
lief, present different forms of imagination in propositional form, of which 
indicative imagination—which they assert is easily triggered by perception—is 
of interest. To imagine P in the guise of indicative imagination, Bayne and 
Pacherie inform us, “is to have some inclination—however slight—to think 
that P is the case” (2005: 167). In fact: 
Indicative imagination and belief seem to be on a continuum, insofar as 
both are attitudes to the way the world actually is (ibid.)... To imagine P in 
the indicative sense is to think that P might actually be true, it is to take P 
as a contender for the truth. (ibid. 170) 
The subpersonal selection of the best candidate hypothesis, as proposed by 
Coltheart et al.—based as it is on perceptual information indicating some state 
of the world (the authenticity of the husband’s wife)—seems compatible with 
the belief-like proposition referred to by Bayne and Pacherie as indicative 
imagination. After all, the very nature of abductive inference is that it should 
select, as a contender for the truth, the ‘best fit’ hypothesis from those availa-
ble, irrespective of whether this results in a claim to the truth of P or, more 
relevant to the Capgras delusion, the truth of (Hs) (Coltheart, Langdon 
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& McKay 2011). The ‘belief’ which permeates consciousness should therefore 
be likened to an example of indicative imagination. In effect, the non-deluded 
patient or even the Capgras husband, at this stage, is entertaining the possibil-
ity that the woman who looks like his wife is an impostor (this proposition has 
been selected as a contender for the truth). 
In the case of the Capgras delusion, it is my contention that the stranger hy-
pothesis (Hs) enters consciousness as a thought whose function is captured by 
Bayne and Pacherie’s indicative imagination. It is also my contention that this 
thought is provided a context in virtue of the co-occurrence of an anomalous 
experience. If the thought is also accompanied by a sense of conviction then 
this too will be more meaningful if present in conjunction with an anomalous 
experience. The patient may reflect: “It makes sense that this thought is credi-
ble given what I am experiencing” (again, much as I have argued in the case of 
HS and the patient who was treated for epilepsy). How the Capgras and non-
deluded patients differ is, in accordance with Turner and Coltheart (2010), 
down to a difference in their conscious checking or belief evaluation system 
(Coltheart 2007). 
 
6. Putting it all together 
Given the occurrence of the anomalous experience alongside the thought 
“This person is an impostor” (or something similar), perhaps even with an 
accompanying sense of conviction, the patient elevates the thought (qua indic-
ative imagining) to the status of a belief because the thought (now a belief) 
helps explain the patient’s strange experience by giving it meaning. The 
anomalous nature of the Capgras patient’s experience can be likened to 
a sense of unfamiliarity in the form of estrangement (Young 2007, 2008b, 2009, 
2010). The patient’s acceptance of the impostor belief should be understood in 
terms of the role it plays in explaining why there is a change in the patient’s 
experience—the feeling of estrangement—when in the presence of his (puta-
tive) wife. Importantly, the now accepted belief shapes the nature of the expe-
riential content such that belief and experience become congruent (Young 
2008a; 2011a). To explain: when the belief is formed, the patient no longer 
experiences a feeling of estrangement towards the putative wife because what 
he now perceives (shaped as it is by the belief) is an impostor. Given that he 
believes he is looking at an impostor, what was once a sense of unfamiliarity 
in the form of estrangement—the anomalous experience—is now transformed 
into an experience of how one should feel when in the presence of a stranger. 
What the patient feels now accords with the normative state of familiarity 
associated with strangers: namely, a lack of familiarity.  
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Breaking down what enters consciousness into stages, we get: 
(a) The co-occurrence of anomalous experience (feeling of unfamiliarity as 
estrangement) and the thought (qua indicative imagining): “This person is 
not my wife, she is an impostor”. 
(b) The anomalous experience gives meaning to the thought (qua indicative 
imagining). It makes sense that I should be thinking this given what I am 
feeling. 
(c) The thought (qua indicative imagining) is accepted as a belief (change of 
epistemic status) because it helps explain the experience (compatible with 
the explanationist account). In turn, the newly acquired belief helps shape 
the husband’s perception of his putative impostor wife. Given that the 
husband now believes she is an impostor, an imposter is what he perceives 
(sees). Importantly, this is also compatible with the endorsement account 
because the belief, in addition to explaining the initial anomalous experi-
ence and helping transform the experience, now acts to endorse what the 
husband experiences: he perceives an impostor wife and seeing is further 
evidence for believing. 
(d) The anomalous feeling that was once interpreted as a feeling of unfamili-
arity in the form of estrangement is now transformed into a normative 
feeling of familiarity regarding the impostor: namely, a lack of familiarity. 
This is how I should feel when in the presence of a stranger. 
(e) The belief and the experience are now congruent and locked in a cycle of 
mutual effect. Given what I believe, it makes sense that this is how I feel.  
The (delusional) belief serves a dual function. Not only does it provide 
a means of interpreting the experience—of accounting for its anomalousness 
(thereby serving an explanationist function)—it also instils meaning. The pa-
tient looks to the belief, “That woman is not my wife, she is an impostor” to 
give some semblance of meaning to his sense of estrangement. Forming and 
accepting this belief then structures what he see when he looks at the woman: 
namely, an impostor (thereby serving an endorsement function). In terms of 
explaining the belief’s resistance to revision: Why would he look to revise 
such a match up? From the patient’s perspective, the validity of the belief and 
the authenticity of the experience are inextricably linked insofar as the con-
gruence between belief and experience provides strong (personal) evidence 
for the validity of the former and the authenticity of the latter. 
In relation to this last point, Leeser and O’Donohue (1999) argue that delu-
sional beliefs are resistant to revision because their content is unfalsifiable, 
particularly from the first-person perspective (see also Davies et al., 2001). 
How does one refute the claim that someone is an impostor? After all, modern 
or alien technology (“That we don’t yet know about”)—even magic or the dark 
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arts—may be capable of such physical duplication, even of DNA (Broome 
2004). Everyone else may be fooled, including family and friends, but not the 
subject of the delusion. The fact that it may be difficult to refute the delusional 
belief because of the nature of its content may add to the reasons why the 
belief is maintained; but, for the Capgras patient, perhaps it is enough that the 
delusional belief authenticates the experience in a manner that no alternative 
proposition can. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper has been to reinstate a role for patient experience in 
light of Coltheart et al.’s revisionist model which renders such experience re-
dundant. While I find much within Coltheart et al.’s approach instructive, 
I nevertheless consider there to be problems with the model as its stands; hav-
ing said that, I do not advocate abandoning the model altogether. Others 
(McKay 2012; see also Davies & Egan 2013) have provided detailed critical dis-
cussion on the Bayesian approach adopted by Coltheart et al.; asking whether 
the Capgras patient adheres to a normative or biased Bayesian model. I have 
chosen instead to address problems with the notion that (a) a belief enters 
consciousness, rather than merely a thought, and (b) that this belief consti-
tutes the first delusion-related event of which the patient is conscious. What 
I hope to have shown is that there is more explanatory worth in positing the 
co-occurrence of thought and anomalous experience prior to the formation of 
the delusional belief. Such a position is compatible with both abnormal data O 
and the use of abductive inference. 
As a final point, given that I have not discussed how it is that the delusional 
belief, once formed, is maintained, what is left unclear is how many factors 
are involved in the formation and maintenance of the delusion. Davies and 
Egan (2013) have pointed out that Coltheart et al. require only one factor (or 
deficit) prior to the belief formation and a second to account for its mainte-
nance (a deficit in belief evaluation). McKay, on the other hand, posits two 
deficits prior to belief formation. Davies and Egan then speculate over the 
extent to which this account requires a further factor to account for the be-
lief’s maintenance. I am agnostic when it comes to whether the Bayesian 
model is biased (McKay) or unbiased (Coltheart et al.), and so whether one or 
two deficits are required prior to belief formation (I concur that a deficit in 
the face recognition system forms the neurological basis for the disorder). All 
I insist on is that the (delusional) belief formation is the product of a deficit in 
the patient’s conscious belief evaluation system (Coltheart 2007), and that for 
this to result in the formation of the delusional belief, two delusion-related 
events must co-occur in consciousness: the impostor thought and the anoma-
lous experience. 
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